The problem in Af-Pak is Pak
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 11.12.2009
How President Obama’s Af-Pak policy plays itself out may become clearer against a backdrop.
Since President Musharraf’s reputation had sunk after Lal Masjid, sacking of the Chief Justice, declaration of emergency, Washington and London began to encourage Benazir Bhutto’s candidature as Prime Minister because she had promised to give the US a free hand in directing the war against terror. President Musharraf could not have been dispensed with immediately because President Bush’s incantation of his great qualities as an ally against terrorism.
When Benazir Bhutto landed in Karachi on October 18, 2007, a bomb blast very nearly killed her. She told her close advisers that she had not anticipated such anti Americanism before returning to Pakistan. She soon realized the unpopularity of the war against terror with which Musharraf and the Americans were associated. She began to change her tune. This did not prevent her assassination on December 27.
The deal to have a troika – President, Army Chief, Prime Minister – was struck between the Americans, Gen. Kayani, President Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. After Benazir’s death and Musharraf’s departure the power structure in Islamabad was a quick improvisation having neither legitimacy nor acceptability with the people – a burden America carries to this day.
This is the real American dilemma as it embarks on an Af-Pak policy just spelt out: to find allies in Islamabad who reduce not multiply anti Americanism.
The “surge” will be concentrated in the Pushtun areas – Helmand and Kandahar. But US drones, in co-ordination with the Pak Army, will target the extensive Pushtun areas across the Af-Pak border.
There will be a blowback which will aggravate anti Americanism. What will help Washington at some stage is a civilian government in Islamabad which is not seen to be an American lap dog.
Since the Pakistan Army has in recent months taken casualties in the war, the blowback may not be as severe.
Look at the complexity. Anti Americanism continues to grow because of the war on terror. And yet we are being told that the Pak Army’s participation in the war no longer has such a negative echo among the people, that the “blowback” has weakened. We have to wait and see.
There is another piece of confusion. The US clearly makes a distinction between the Al Qaeda and the Taleban which New Delhi does not. The distinction has the effect of leaving the door open for a dialogue with “good Taleban”. This also leaves the Pakistan establishment with its “assets” in the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan in tact.
Yes, it is true that various Islamic groups – Uighurs, Chechens, Uzbeks and Arabs of various descriptions did descend on Afghanistan to join the “holy” war against the Soviet Union and later, in response the Osama bin Laden’s call.
But most of these have apparently raised families in the FATA areas. Drone attacks on them will cause this obvious collateral damage. More crucially, how is a Taleban to be separated from an ordinary Pushtun?
Under these circumstances how will Pushtun nationalism on both sides of the border be contained? (This writer has been pessimistic on this score)
There have been in recent months facile comparisons with Iraq where the “surge” is believed to have worked.
No two situations are more dissimilar. US occupation of Iraq brought into the world’s focus for the first time a new reality: that (sixty five) 65 per cent of the Iraqi population is Shia. This majority population was so relieved of Baathist repression that, barring exceptions, they welcomed the US.
Also, US occupation has more or less secured Kurdish de facto autonomy in the north.
There are no such welcoming groups in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
For the first time in years there is an escalation in decibel level from Pakistan seeking Indian toning down of development work in Afghanistan and resolution of Kashmir to normalize bilateral relations. This possibly betrays a misreading of statements made by US military officers as hints from US government.
New Delhi’s position is fairly straightforward. As soon as the perpetrators of Mumbai are brought before credible judicial authority, the composite dialogue can be resumed. In this framework all issues, including Kashmir, will be on the table.
What Islamabad must realize is this: New Delhi sees balkanization of Pakistan a frightful prospect and will go any distance to normalize with Pakistan provided Islamabad resiles from its unreasonable, maximalist positions on Kashmir and Afghanistan.
# # # # # #
Friday, December 18, 2009
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Revisiting Politics of Temples and Mosques
Revisiting Politics of Temples and Mosques -- By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 26.11.2009
The Librehan Commission report on the events leading to the demolition of Babari Masjid on December 6, 1992 has once again brought into focus a deplorable chapter in Indian History. Sadly, no contemporary historian has so far analyzed all the dimensions of the catastrophic event. Librehan gives us only a unidimensional, flat narrative.
Several fault lines had got entangled. There was, ofcourse, the Hindu-Muslim fault- line but there were others, each aggravating the next one. There was the north-south factor within the Congress party. Upper caste- lower caste divide, amplified by the Mandal commission report. Finally, there was a divide among the upper castes which came across as a Brahmin-non Brahmin tussle, also primarily within the Congress party.
Let me explain.
In the 1991 elections, the Congress, with 244 seats (272 are needed to form the government) did poorly in the Hindi belt. The balance of power within the party shifted towards the southern states.
Since the BJP had emerged powerful in the north, (120 seats from two seats in 1984) a sort of unstated compact emerged, particularly between P.V Narasimha Rao and Atal Behari Vajpayee. The BJP would not be disturbed in its northern citadel. The Congress, short of a majority, would likewise not be threatened. This implied that Congress revival in the north would be kept in check. What was the game? Well, if the Congress revived in the north, leaders like Narain Dutt Tewari, Jagannath Mishra, even Arjun Singh may threaten P .V Narasimha Rao, India’s first South Indian Prime Minister.
There are conspiracy theorists who believe that P.V and his Sancho Panza, Home Minister S.B.Chavan, fell back on total inaction throughout the seven hours that the Babari Masjid was systematically pulled down because they were not averse to the BJP gaining in strength in the north to keep potential Congress challengers outside the playfield. Don’t forget, this was the very beginning of PV’s Prime ministerial innings.
Notice the paradox.
There is a north-south divide within the Congress, but an unstated north-south rapport between the Congress and the BJP.
Part of this latter rapport had its roots in the caste divisions sharpened by the Mandal Commission report providing reservation in Government jobs to the “other backward castes” or OBC’s.
In the south and the Deccan belt, social reform movements had gradually ironed out caste divisions since the 30’s. It was in the Hindi belt where the political consequences of Mandal Commission set into motion turbulent, tectonic shifts. Emergence of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Lalu Prasad Yadav and the Kanshi Ram – Mayawati duet shook the entrenched caste elite which straddled both sides of the Congress- BJP divide.
The Ram Janmbhoomi- Babri Masjid conflict was the BJP’s device to consolidate Hindus around a potent, emotive issue. The Mandir movement, in considerable measure , was to neutralize Mandal. In other words, a desire to minimize Hindu fragmentation was at the heart of a movement which would not have become such a powerful movement had the Babri Masjid Action Committee not become the convenient counterpoint, incrementally and unwittingly strengthening the Mandir movement.
Another factor attended P.V.Narasimha Rao’s ascension to the Prime Ministership. In the 1991 elections. Congress leaders who lost were Narain Dutt Tewari, Lokpati Tripati, Rajendra Kumari Bajpai, Jagannath Mishra, Jitendra Prasad, Bindeshwari Dubey, K.K.Tewari, Vasant Sathe, V.N.Gadgil, Gundu Rao. All of these were Brahmins, clearly a casualty of caste politics aggravated by Mandal.
With 244 seats, PV needed tacit agreement with Atal Behari Vajpayee’s BJP. This resulted in two contradictory schools within the Congress. K Karunakaran, like PV, encouraged a soft line towards the BJP for his own circumstances in Kerala.
There were RSS cadres in Kerala but the BJP had never won a seat. Since the RSS-BJP were primarily an anti Marxist force in the state, whenever the combination worked for the Congress, it made a difference of just that one percent vote needed for Congress led UDF to win.
But Arjun Singh had to fight the BJP tooth and nail in Madhya Pradesh. Little wonder he was totally opposed to the PV (and Karunakaran) line on the BJP. Over a period of time, this open disagreement acquired caste overtones.
The excitement generated by the Librehan report is temporary. It cannot resurrect the Mandir movement. The soufflé rises only once.
But the historian owes to posterity a clinical appraisal of the events leading upto the darkest chapter in Indian History.
# # # #
Dated: 26.11.2009
The Librehan Commission report on the events leading to the demolition of Babari Masjid on December 6, 1992 has once again brought into focus a deplorable chapter in Indian History. Sadly, no contemporary historian has so far analyzed all the dimensions of the catastrophic event. Librehan gives us only a unidimensional, flat narrative.
Several fault lines had got entangled. There was, ofcourse, the Hindu-Muslim fault- line but there were others, each aggravating the next one. There was the north-south factor within the Congress party. Upper caste- lower caste divide, amplified by the Mandal commission report. Finally, there was a divide among the upper castes which came across as a Brahmin-non Brahmin tussle, also primarily within the Congress party.
Let me explain.
In the 1991 elections, the Congress, with 244 seats (272 are needed to form the government) did poorly in the Hindi belt. The balance of power within the party shifted towards the southern states.
Since the BJP had emerged powerful in the north, (120 seats from two seats in 1984) a sort of unstated compact emerged, particularly between P.V Narasimha Rao and Atal Behari Vajpayee. The BJP would not be disturbed in its northern citadel. The Congress, short of a majority, would likewise not be threatened. This implied that Congress revival in the north would be kept in check. What was the game? Well, if the Congress revived in the north, leaders like Narain Dutt Tewari, Jagannath Mishra, even Arjun Singh may threaten P .V Narasimha Rao, India’s first South Indian Prime Minister.
There are conspiracy theorists who believe that P.V and his Sancho Panza, Home Minister S.B.Chavan, fell back on total inaction throughout the seven hours that the Babari Masjid was systematically pulled down because they were not averse to the BJP gaining in strength in the north to keep potential Congress challengers outside the playfield. Don’t forget, this was the very beginning of PV’s Prime ministerial innings.
Notice the paradox.
There is a north-south divide within the Congress, but an unstated north-south rapport between the Congress and the BJP.
Part of this latter rapport had its roots in the caste divisions sharpened by the Mandal Commission report providing reservation in Government jobs to the “other backward castes” or OBC’s.
In the south and the Deccan belt, social reform movements had gradually ironed out caste divisions since the 30’s. It was in the Hindi belt where the political consequences of Mandal Commission set into motion turbulent, tectonic shifts. Emergence of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Lalu Prasad Yadav and the Kanshi Ram – Mayawati duet shook the entrenched caste elite which straddled both sides of the Congress- BJP divide.
The Ram Janmbhoomi- Babri Masjid conflict was the BJP’s device to consolidate Hindus around a potent, emotive issue. The Mandir movement, in considerable measure , was to neutralize Mandal. In other words, a desire to minimize Hindu fragmentation was at the heart of a movement which would not have become such a powerful movement had the Babri Masjid Action Committee not become the convenient counterpoint, incrementally and unwittingly strengthening the Mandir movement.
Another factor attended P.V.Narasimha Rao’s ascension to the Prime Ministership. In the 1991 elections. Congress leaders who lost were Narain Dutt Tewari, Lokpati Tripati, Rajendra Kumari Bajpai, Jagannath Mishra, Jitendra Prasad, Bindeshwari Dubey, K.K.Tewari, Vasant Sathe, V.N.Gadgil, Gundu Rao. All of these were Brahmins, clearly a casualty of caste politics aggravated by Mandal.
With 244 seats, PV needed tacit agreement with Atal Behari Vajpayee’s BJP. This resulted in two contradictory schools within the Congress. K Karunakaran, like PV, encouraged a soft line towards the BJP for his own circumstances in Kerala.
There were RSS cadres in Kerala but the BJP had never won a seat. Since the RSS-BJP were primarily an anti Marxist force in the state, whenever the combination worked for the Congress, it made a difference of just that one percent vote needed for Congress led UDF to win.
But Arjun Singh had to fight the BJP tooth and nail in Madhya Pradesh. Little wonder he was totally opposed to the PV (and Karunakaran) line on the BJP. Over a period of time, this open disagreement acquired caste overtones.
The excitement generated by the Librehan report is temporary. It cannot resurrect the Mandir movement. The soufflé rises only once.
But the historian owes to posterity a clinical appraisal of the events leading upto the darkest chapter in Indian History.
# # # #
Friday, November 13, 2009
How to check Pak Anti Americanism
How to check Pak Anti Americanism
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 12.11.2009
The questions around Iran’s Presidential election, amplified by the Western media, would pale before the outright fraud involved in the elections in neighbouring Afghanistan. Little wonder Peter Galbraith, the UN’s second in Command in Kabul and a friend of special envoy to Af-Pak, Richard Holbrook, left in protest.
Slowly, a somewhat steadied script is coming into focus both in Teheran as well as in Kabul. Iran is now engaged in the dialogue process.
Now that run-off elections in Kabul having been called off, the way has probably been paved for some sort of a holding operation – a government of national unity, under whatever guise.
This backdrop may be useful to gauge how Washington might view the current turbulence in Pakistan.
President Bush always described Gen. Musharraf in the most glowing terms: Musharraf was Bush’s “greatest” ally in the war against terror.
By 2007, this “war on terror” began to recoil on Musharraf and Pakistan. There were 70 suicide attacks in 2007 as against six in 2006 – growing in direct proportion to the US or Pak action in the Af-Pak border areas.
How to protect Musharraf from the blowback? Also, for sheer survival, he was obviously playing both sides of the street because the epicenter of the militancy had shifted to the Pakistan side of Af-Pak.
One way to get out of the jam was to have a more diffuse power structure in Islamabad. Instead of Musharraf facing the blowback in isolation, a troika of President Musharraf, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani would share the brunt.
Benazir had persuaded Washington and London that not only would she throw everything at her command in the “war on terror” but she would even hand over A.Q. Khan to the US for scrutiny.
The deal thus sealed, Benazir returned and, in an atmosphere of anti Americanism, was assassinated.
Meanwhile, Musharraf found himself on a slippery slope: Lal Masjid fiasco, (it was suddenly realized that there were 88 Madrasas with 20,000 students in and around the Pakistan capital); sacking of the chief justice, emergency, lawyers’ movement…..
The deal was between Musharraf, Benazir, Army and the Americans. Therefore an election in a post Benazir situation could yield unexpected and unmanageable results. This the Americans could not risk in the midst of their own Presidential campaign.
Paradoxically, Americans needed elections to keep the US Congress off their backs. Under the circumstances, even “sanitized” elections were acceptable. Little wonder, the International Republican Institute, which was to monitor the elections, left.
After a series of remarkable gyrations, (son Bilal Zardari was renamed Bilal Bhutto at a tribal ceremony) Zardari was helped onto the gaddi via an election process.
Without any American affiliations, Nawaz Sharief made a good showing and ended up with the powerful chief ministership of Punjab.
The rest is recent history.
What is on show now in Islamabad is a feat of incredible agility by Zardari, a sort of tap-dance on a floor riddled with mines. Sooner or later he will trip. He is making cow-eyes at the Americans who, at this juncture, are not interested in salvaging the country’s most unpopular leader.
What has hit the Americans where it hurts is the massive public outrage at the Kerry-Lugar bill.
“Here we are throwing $7.5 billion at them only to be reviled and hated!” How can this be minimized?
The US has learnt some lessons in the region the hard way. It indicated a preference for Rafsanjani in 2005 and Ahmedinejad won. Karzai was sanctified by the West. He turned out to be less than an effective mayor of Kabul. The US acquiesced in “Mister 10 percent”. The dislike for him has in geometrical progression multiplied anti Americanism.
It is argued that Prime Minister Gilani has a clean image. But can he control the anti American tidal wave?
Nawaz Sharief, on the other hand is free of the US taint. He is much the most popular politician with links to the Taleban too through personal and Saudi connections. He will be a popular leader who in the ultimate analysis, will after all, need the Americans. As far as the Army is concerned, his blood fued was with Musharraf not Kayani!
# # # # # #
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 12.11.2009
The questions around Iran’s Presidential election, amplified by the Western media, would pale before the outright fraud involved in the elections in neighbouring Afghanistan. Little wonder Peter Galbraith, the UN’s second in Command in Kabul and a friend of special envoy to Af-Pak, Richard Holbrook, left in protest.
Slowly, a somewhat steadied script is coming into focus both in Teheran as well as in Kabul. Iran is now engaged in the dialogue process.
Now that run-off elections in Kabul having been called off, the way has probably been paved for some sort of a holding operation – a government of national unity, under whatever guise.
This backdrop may be useful to gauge how Washington might view the current turbulence in Pakistan.
President Bush always described Gen. Musharraf in the most glowing terms: Musharraf was Bush’s “greatest” ally in the war against terror.
By 2007, this “war on terror” began to recoil on Musharraf and Pakistan. There were 70 suicide attacks in 2007 as against six in 2006 – growing in direct proportion to the US or Pak action in the Af-Pak border areas.
How to protect Musharraf from the blowback? Also, for sheer survival, he was obviously playing both sides of the street because the epicenter of the militancy had shifted to the Pakistan side of Af-Pak.
One way to get out of the jam was to have a more diffuse power structure in Islamabad. Instead of Musharraf facing the blowback in isolation, a troika of President Musharraf, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani would share the brunt.
Benazir had persuaded Washington and London that not only would she throw everything at her command in the “war on terror” but she would even hand over A.Q. Khan to the US for scrutiny.
The deal thus sealed, Benazir returned and, in an atmosphere of anti Americanism, was assassinated.
Meanwhile, Musharraf found himself on a slippery slope: Lal Masjid fiasco, (it was suddenly realized that there were 88 Madrasas with 20,000 students in and around the Pakistan capital); sacking of the chief justice, emergency, lawyers’ movement…..
The deal was between Musharraf, Benazir, Army and the Americans. Therefore an election in a post Benazir situation could yield unexpected and unmanageable results. This the Americans could not risk in the midst of their own Presidential campaign.
Paradoxically, Americans needed elections to keep the US Congress off their backs. Under the circumstances, even “sanitized” elections were acceptable. Little wonder, the International Republican Institute, which was to monitor the elections, left.
After a series of remarkable gyrations, (son Bilal Zardari was renamed Bilal Bhutto at a tribal ceremony) Zardari was helped onto the gaddi via an election process.
Without any American affiliations, Nawaz Sharief made a good showing and ended up with the powerful chief ministership of Punjab.
The rest is recent history.
What is on show now in Islamabad is a feat of incredible agility by Zardari, a sort of tap-dance on a floor riddled with mines. Sooner or later he will trip. He is making cow-eyes at the Americans who, at this juncture, are not interested in salvaging the country’s most unpopular leader.
What has hit the Americans where it hurts is the massive public outrage at the Kerry-Lugar bill.
“Here we are throwing $7.5 billion at them only to be reviled and hated!” How can this be minimized?
The US has learnt some lessons in the region the hard way. It indicated a preference for Rafsanjani in 2005 and Ahmedinejad won. Karzai was sanctified by the West. He turned out to be less than an effective mayor of Kabul. The US acquiesced in “Mister 10 percent”. The dislike for him has in geometrical progression multiplied anti Americanism.
It is argued that Prime Minister Gilani has a clean image. But can he control the anti American tidal wave?
Nawaz Sharief, on the other hand is free of the US taint. He is much the most popular politician with links to the Taleban too through personal and Saudi connections. He will be a popular leader who in the ultimate analysis, will after all, need the Americans. As far as the Army is concerned, his blood fued was with Musharraf not Kayani!
# # # # # #
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Iran - Israel contacts
Iran – Israel contacts
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 26.10.2009
That Moscow’s support has been enlisted by the US in the diplomacy around Iran’s nuclear plans has not been without considerable behind-the-scenes goading by France and Germany.
The very heart of “Old Europe” was never comfortable with anti ballistic missile systems being positioned in what Donald Rumsfeld called “New Europe”, namely the Czech Republic and Poland. After all, Moscow’s diplomatic support on Iran was obtained only after Washington agreed to withdraw missiles form Eastern Europe.
But for Moscow it has not been a mechanical quit-pro-quo. Political advisers around the Kremlin have done their homework and joined the Iranian diplomatic concert after extensive discussions with the key country in the Middle East – Israel.
At a recent seminar in Herzilia, Israel, senior members of the Jewish state’s intelligence community like former Mossad Chief Shabtai Shavit, argued that the West’s adversarial relations with Moscow would worsen with the deployment of missiles in Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances it would be impossible to have Russian support on the Iranian nuclear issue. Israel sees this as an existential problem.
But realism dictates that Israeli nuclear arsenal is, likewise, an existential issue for Iran. In this context, statements from Washington policy makers like Bruce Riedel are seen by Iranians as “being helpful”. Riedel said that “double standards” in the Middle East on the nuclear issue are not conducive to peace.
Therefore, embedded somewhere in the sub text of all the moves whether in Geneva or Vienna is to bring out into the open Israel’s nuclear arsenal. It is recognized that resistance to this within Israel and an influential segment of the US will be profound.
Meanwhile some direct Israeli-Iranian contacts have already been established. While Tel Aviv has confirmed the contact, Teheran has not.
It would be interesting to gauge the dynamics within Iran following the demonstrations against President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s June 12 re election led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mir Hussein Mousavi, the candidate who lost the disputed poll.
These are being hailed as the first contacts between Iran and Israel in 30 years when the Ayatuallahs first came to power in 1979. But this is in reality only a partial truth because in 1986, the Reagan administration made clandestine contacts with the Iranian regime. The story exploded as the infamous Iran-Contra deal or Irangate. It was a complex deal in which Iran would be supplied Israeli arms to continue the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Israel would be re supplied the arms. But the money from the Iranian sales would be funneled to the Contras who were waging a war against the pro Soviet Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
Reagan’s National Security Adviser, Admiral Poindexter, declared that “high level” contacts had been established in Teheran in the course of the controversial deal.
The “high level” contact turned out to be the then Speaker of the Iranian Majlis, Hashemi Rafsanjani, currently leading the charge against President Ahmedinejad.
When Irangate exploded as a major scandal which crippled the Reagan Presidency, the revelations did not seem to adversely affect Rafsanjani’s political fortunes. He proceeded to become President in 1989 for two terms.
Also, the Irangate taint did not seem to rub off on the present Spiritual Leader, Ali Khameini. He happened to be President in 1986, the year of Irangate. It is unlikely that Speaker of the Majlis, Rafsanjani, would have embarked on an audacious foreign policy initiative with the US and Israel without clearance from the then President, Ali Khamenei. Despite Irangate, Khameini too earned a promotion: he is the Spiritual leader today.
The interesting fact today is that Rafsanjani and Khameini are on opposite sides in the post election standoff.
Since the US ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Saudi Arabia has watched developments with deep anxiety. Saddam was bad, but the emergence of Shia dominated Iraq next to Saudi oil bearing region of Damman, predominantly Shia, is something of a nightmare. Further, Shia majority in Bahrein, Lebanon, a large population of Shias in Kuwait are all morale boosters for Teheran. Little wonder then that Saudis were invited to be present at the series Iranian-Israeli meetings in September. Also, Riadh has been encouraged to appoint a special envoy for Jammu and Kashmir under the auspices of the hurriedly rejuvenated OIC. Mysteriously, neither the government nor the Indian media has taken much note of this development.
# # # # # #
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 26.10.2009
That Moscow’s support has been enlisted by the US in the diplomacy around Iran’s nuclear plans has not been without considerable behind-the-scenes goading by France and Germany.
The very heart of “Old Europe” was never comfortable with anti ballistic missile systems being positioned in what Donald Rumsfeld called “New Europe”, namely the Czech Republic and Poland. After all, Moscow’s diplomatic support on Iran was obtained only after Washington agreed to withdraw missiles form Eastern Europe.
But for Moscow it has not been a mechanical quit-pro-quo. Political advisers around the Kremlin have done their homework and joined the Iranian diplomatic concert after extensive discussions with the key country in the Middle East – Israel.
At a recent seminar in Herzilia, Israel, senior members of the Jewish state’s intelligence community like former Mossad Chief Shabtai Shavit, argued that the West’s adversarial relations with Moscow would worsen with the deployment of missiles in Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances it would be impossible to have Russian support on the Iranian nuclear issue. Israel sees this as an existential problem.
But realism dictates that Israeli nuclear arsenal is, likewise, an existential issue for Iran. In this context, statements from Washington policy makers like Bruce Riedel are seen by Iranians as “being helpful”. Riedel said that “double standards” in the Middle East on the nuclear issue are not conducive to peace.
Therefore, embedded somewhere in the sub text of all the moves whether in Geneva or Vienna is to bring out into the open Israel’s nuclear arsenal. It is recognized that resistance to this within Israel and an influential segment of the US will be profound.
Meanwhile some direct Israeli-Iranian contacts have already been established. While Tel Aviv has confirmed the contact, Teheran has not.
It would be interesting to gauge the dynamics within Iran following the demonstrations against President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s June 12 re election led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mir Hussein Mousavi, the candidate who lost the disputed poll.
These are being hailed as the first contacts between Iran and Israel in 30 years when the Ayatuallahs first came to power in 1979. But this is in reality only a partial truth because in 1986, the Reagan administration made clandestine contacts with the Iranian regime. The story exploded as the infamous Iran-Contra deal or Irangate. It was a complex deal in which Iran would be supplied Israeli arms to continue the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Israel would be re supplied the arms. But the money from the Iranian sales would be funneled to the Contras who were waging a war against the pro Soviet Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
Reagan’s National Security Adviser, Admiral Poindexter, declared that “high level” contacts had been established in Teheran in the course of the controversial deal.
The “high level” contact turned out to be the then Speaker of the Iranian Majlis, Hashemi Rafsanjani, currently leading the charge against President Ahmedinejad.
When Irangate exploded as a major scandal which crippled the Reagan Presidency, the revelations did not seem to adversely affect Rafsanjani’s political fortunes. He proceeded to become President in 1989 for two terms.
Also, the Irangate taint did not seem to rub off on the present Spiritual Leader, Ali Khameini. He happened to be President in 1986, the year of Irangate. It is unlikely that Speaker of the Majlis, Rafsanjani, would have embarked on an audacious foreign policy initiative with the US and Israel without clearance from the then President, Ali Khamenei. Despite Irangate, Khameini too earned a promotion: he is the Spiritual leader today.
The interesting fact today is that Rafsanjani and Khameini are on opposite sides in the post election standoff.
Since the US ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Saudi Arabia has watched developments with deep anxiety. Saddam was bad, but the emergence of Shia dominated Iraq next to Saudi oil bearing region of Damman, predominantly Shia, is something of a nightmare. Further, Shia majority in Bahrein, Lebanon, a large population of Shias in Kuwait are all morale boosters for Teheran. Little wonder then that Saudis were invited to be present at the series Iranian-Israeli meetings in September. Also, Riadh has been encouraged to appoint a special envoy for Jammu and Kashmir under the auspices of the hurriedly rejuvenated OIC. Mysteriously, neither the government nor the Indian media has taken much note of this development.
# # # # # #
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Iran – US entente: a backgrounder
Iran – US entente: a backgrounder
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 06.10.2009
In its dialogue with Teheran, which began in Geneva, the international community led by Washington will have to proceed cautiously to be able to retain the support of that faction of the Iranian establishment opposed to the Supreme leader Ali Khameini and President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. The presence of this pressure group has the potential of moderating the course of dialogue.
For Teheran the opening of the newly declared reprocessing plant at QOM for inspection is serving its purpose: the Iranian Government is already looking reasonable. This has the potential of denying the Iranian opposition, led by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mir Hussein Mousavi, the exclusiveness of the moderate image.
A triangular format is emerging.
To understand the implications of this triangle, it may be useful to take the narrative back to the mid 70s for reasons which will presently become clear.
Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia had all been lost to communism. Berlinguer, Marchais, and Corrilo were powerful in Italy, France and Spain. Even Henry Kissinger feared a Marxist Western Europe in the next fifteen years.
At that stage, give or take a few years, the Shah in Iran, Daud in Afghanistan, Zia ul Haq in Pakistan, Morarji Desai in India, J.R. Jayawardene in Sri Lanka offered comfort to a west in retreat elsewhere. These were all pro west regimes.
But in the space of a few years, Daud was killed, the Shah ousted and Indira Gandhi was back in power. Only Zia ul Haq stayed on, after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s judicial murder, to wage “Jehad” for the west, the consequence of which the region is bearing to this day.
Daud’s murder was the result of a botched up plan by the Shah’s notorious secret Service, Savak, to eliminate the “Left” from around Daud. The plan leaked and a pre-emptive strike by Khalq and Parcham, the two communist parties of Afghanistan, brought a somewhat unprepared Noor Mohammad Taraki, to power in Kabul as the country’s first Communist President. He was followed by the more ruthless Hafizullah Amin, then Babrak Karmal and finally the hapless Najibullah, lynched by the Afghan Mujahideen in Kabul’s UN compound. The Afghan “Jehad” against Communists and Sovietism was by now at an advanced stage, resulting in Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
A decade earlier, the Savak inspired plan to eliminate the Left around Daud boomeranged, as I have explained earlier. But why was such a plan hatched in the 70s? To forestall communist takeover in the region on the pattern of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. It may be added here, in parenthesis, that it was in the wobbly 70s that Communism also took the electoral route to power – it was, ofcourse, snuffed out in Chile but remains in the gaddi in West Bengal to this day.
Political parties that were underground during the Shah’s rule came out into the open in the first anti Shah flush of the Islamic revolution. Once the Shah was out of the way, the revolution turned upon Tudeh, the Communist Party of Iran and the Leftist Mujahideen-e-Khalq. Elimination of the Left was fine by the West. But the 444 day siege of the US embassy soured relations. Shaitaan-e-Buzurg hoardings went up. The US was the “Senior Satan”. The consolidation of the Ayatullahs had gone woefully wrong for the US.
In 1986, at the peak of President Reagan’s counter offensive after Western retreat elsewhere in the previous decade, surfaced Irangate also known as the Iran – Contra affair. This is when Hashemi Rafsanjani first surfaced as the West’s preferred Iranian. In the Obama administration the person most conversant with this phase of US diplomacy is Defence Secretary, Robert Gates. Gates was deputy to CIA Director William Casey during the Reagan Years. And Casey was in the thick of the Iran Contra affair, as he was in Afghanistan.
The US made clandestine contacts with the Iranian regime. It all began as an operation to improve US-Iran relations, wherein Israel would ship weapons to a “moderate” and politically influential group of Iranians. The US would then resupply Israel and receive Israeli payment. The whole affair erupted as a major scandal. Reagan himself admitted that “what began as a strategic opening to Iran” deteriorated into trading arms for hostages and financing the Contras.
Reagan’s National Security Adviser, Admiral Poindexter told his cabinet colleagues that “high level contacts” in Iran had been secured. One of these contacts was Hashemi Rafsanjani, then the all powerful Speaker of the Majlis. The President of Iran at that stage was the present spiritual leader, Ali Khameini. It is interesting that Khameini and Rafsanjani are on opposite sides in the current stand-off.
Was Rafsanjani’s 1986 contact with the US (indirectly with Israel too) authorized by Ayatullah Ali Khamenei then President of the Islamic Republic? White House documents, now in the public domain, do mention Rafsanjani as a “contact”. Atleast Poindexter is quite clear on this one. Remember Rafsanjani played a key role in securing release of US hostages in Lebanon. His role was also central during the TWA hijack in Beirut, when he traveled to Damascus to secure release of the TWA plane.
In 1989 Rafsanani became President and Ali Khameini the Wali-Faqih or spiritual leader. His second term as President ended in 1997. Despite his image outside Iran as a “moderate”, Rafsanjani was not able to improve relations with the West during his two terms.
Quite possibly he had to play down suspicions aroused during Irangate. Moreover, in Iran’s complex web of checks and balances, it is not possible to bring about shifts in foreign policy on a solo basis.
By the time President Mohammad Khatami’s second term ended in 2005, the US was neck deep in trouble in both Iraq as well as Afghanistan. The US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, kept the Khatami establishment on board during the early Afghan operations for which he was rewarded by being made ambassador to the Green Zone in Baghdad.
Khalilzad had obtained a mandate from the Bush administration to open a dialogue with Teheran. Washington neo cons, however, pulled him back, insisting that the Iranians be engaged only on their role in Iraq. This the Iranians rejected.
After Khatami’s term ended Rafsanjani once again contrived a candidacy for himself for the June 2005 elections. Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was much the underdog in that race.
That Rafsanjani was the preferred candidate of the US became clear after Christianne Amanpour did a high profile interview with him for the CNN. This was the kiss of death at a time when President George W Bush was history’s most hated President, particularly in the Muslim world. The Baseej, or the religious militia put all their strength against Hussein Mousavi and Rafsanjani. Supported by spiritual leader Ali Khameini, Ahmedinejad became the President.
By contrast, the US factor today has been a positive element since the June 2009 Iranian elections. President Obama, by his persona and speeches has softened the Muslim world. This key fact must be recognized. The success of the continuing demonstration against the election results in Iran is a function of a large section of the Iranian public drawing sustenance from the Obama image. A pity, the US media is not playing up this fact.
Bush’s unstated approval of Rafsanjani’s candidature cost Rafsanjani the election in 2005. Even though there has been no overt preference for a candidate by Obama, the international community’s (therefore Obama’s) doubts on the veracity of the results has helped the agitation led by Mousavi and Rafsanjani. Even more important is the split in the ranks of the Iranian clergy in the 16th century Theological University at QOM.
President Obama therefore has support in an influential section of the Iranian establishment. As the dialogue with Iran proceeds, this segment can be moulded into a credible lobby provided, in the process Iranian nationalism is not touched on the raw. Because in that case everyone in Iran will close ranks. Such is the nature of the Iranian people.
Internal to Iran is an important drama proceeding in parallel. For Rafsanjani this could well be a fight to the finish, now that members of his family have been detained on corruption charges. Taking sides in this quarrel will not help. In fact the West may well have to take a call soon on Rafsanjani’s expendability in the interest of a larger purpose, which includes tactful management of the nuclear issue.
# # # # # #
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 06.10.2009
In its dialogue with Teheran, which began in Geneva, the international community led by Washington will have to proceed cautiously to be able to retain the support of that faction of the Iranian establishment opposed to the Supreme leader Ali Khameini and President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. The presence of this pressure group has the potential of moderating the course of dialogue.
For Teheran the opening of the newly declared reprocessing plant at QOM for inspection is serving its purpose: the Iranian Government is already looking reasonable. This has the potential of denying the Iranian opposition, led by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mir Hussein Mousavi, the exclusiveness of the moderate image.
A triangular format is emerging.
To understand the implications of this triangle, it may be useful to take the narrative back to the mid 70s for reasons which will presently become clear.
Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia had all been lost to communism. Berlinguer, Marchais, and Corrilo were powerful in Italy, France and Spain. Even Henry Kissinger feared a Marxist Western Europe in the next fifteen years.
At that stage, give or take a few years, the Shah in Iran, Daud in Afghanistan, Zia ul Haq in Pakistan, Morarji Desai in India, J.R. Jayawardene in Sri Lanka offered comfort to a west in retreat elsewhere. These were all pro west regimes.
But in the space of a few years, Daud was killed, the Shah ousted and Indira Gandhi was back in power. Only Zia ul Haq stayed on, after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s judicial murder, to wage “Jehad” for the west, the consequence of which the region is bearing to this day.
Daud’s murder was the result of a botched up plan by the Shah’s notorious secret Service, Savak, to eliminate the “Left” from around Daud. The plan leaked and a pre-emptive strike by Khalq and Parcham, the two communist parties of Afghanistan, brought a somewhat unprepared Noor Mohammad Taraki, to power in Kabul as the country’s first Communist President. He was followed by the more ruthless Hafizullah Amin, then Babrak Karmal and finally the hapless Najibullah, lynched by the Afghan Mujahideen in Kabul’s UN compound. The Afghan “Jehad” against Communists and Sovietism was by now at an advanced stage, resulting in Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
A decade earlier, the Savak inspired plan to eliminate the Left around Daud boomeranged, as I have explained earlier. But why was such a plan hatched in the 70s? To forestall communist takeover in the region on the pattern of Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. It may be added here, in parenthesis, that it was in the wobbly 70s that Communism also took the electoral route to power – it was, ofcourse, snuffed out in Chile but remains in the gaddi in West Bengal to this day.
Political parties that were underground during the Shah’s rule came out into the open in the first anti Shah flush of the Islamic revolution. Once the Shah was out of the way, the revolution turned upon Tudeh, the Communist Party of Iran and the Leftist Mujahideen-e-Khalq. Elimination of the Left was fine by the West. But the 444 day siege of the US embassy soured relations. Shaitaan-e-Buzurg hoardings went up. The US was the “Senior Satan”. The consolidation of the Ayatullahs had gone woefully wrong for the US.
In 1986, at the peak of President Reagan’s counter offensive after Western retreat elsewhere in the previous decade, surfaced Irangate also known as the Iran – Contra affair. This is when Hashemi Rafsanjani first surfaced as the West’s preferred Iranian. In the Obama administration the person most conversant with this phase of US diplomacy is Defence Secretary, Robert Gates. Gates was deputy to CIA Director William Casey during the Reagan Years. And Casey was in the thick of the Iran Contra affair, as he was in Afghanistan.
The US made clandestine contacts with the Iranian regime. It all began as an operation to improve US-Iran relations, wherein Israel would ship weapons to a “moderate” and politically influential group of Iranians. The US would then resupply Israel and receive Israeli payment. The whole affair erupted as a major scandal. Reagan himself admitted that “what began as a strategic opening to Iran” deteriorated into trading arms for hostages and financing the Contras.
Reagan’s National Security Adviser, Admiral Poindexter told his cabinet colleagues that “high level contacts” in Iran had been secured. One of these contacts was Hashemi Rafsanjani, then the all powerful Speaker of the Majlis. The President of Iran at that stage was the present spiritual leader, Ali Khameini. It is interesting that Khameini and Rafsanjani are on opposite sides in the current stand-off.
Was Rafsanjani’s 1986 contact with the US (indirectly with Israel too) authorized by Ayatullah Ali Khamenei then President of the Islamic Republic? White House documents, now in the public domain, do mention Rafsanjani as a “contact”. Atleast Poindexter is quite clear on this one. Remember Rafsanjani played a key role in securing release of US hostages in Lebanon. His role was also central during the TWA hijack in Beirut, when he traveled to Damascus to secure release of the TWA plane.
In 1989 Rafsanani became President and Ali Khameini the Wali-Faqih or spiritual leader. His second term as President ended in 1997. Despite his image outside Iran as a “moderate”, Rafsanjani was not able to improve relations with the West during his two terms.
Quite possibly he had to play down suspicions aroused during Irangate. Moreover, in Iran’s complex web of checks and balances, it is not possible to bring about shifts in foreign policy on a solo basis.
By the time President Mohammad Khatami’s second term ended in 2005, the US was neck deep in trouble in both Iraq as well as Afghanistan. The US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, kept the Khatami establishment on board during the early Afghan operations for which he was rewarded by being made ambassador to the Green Zone in Baghdad.
Khalilzad had obtained a mandate from the Bush administration to open a dialogue with Teheran. Washington neo cons, however, pulled him back, insisting that the Iranians be engaged only on their role in Iraq. This the Iranians rejected.
After Khatami’s term ended Rafsanjani once again contrived a candidacy for himself for the June 2005 elections. Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was much the underdog in that race.
That Rafsanjani was the preferred candidate of the US became clear after Christianne Amanpour did a high profile interview with him for the CNN. This was the kiss of death at a time when President George W Bush was history’s most hated President, particularly in the Muslim world. The Baseej, or the religious militia put all their strength against Hussein Mousavi and Rafsanjani. Supported by spiritual leader Ali Khameini, Ahmedinejad became the President.
By contrast, the US factor today has been a positive element since the June 2009 Iranian elections. President Obama, by his persona and speeches has softened the Muslim world. This key fact must be recognized. The success of the continuing demonstration against the election results in Iran is a function of a large section of the Iranian public drawing sustenance from the Obama image. A pity, the US media is not playing up this fact.
Bush’s unstated approval of Rafsanjani’s candidature cost Rafsanjani the election in 2005. Even though there has been no overt preference for a candidate by Obama, the international community’s (therefore Obama’s) doubts on the veracity of the results has helped the agitation led by Mousavi and Rafsanjani. Even more important is the split in the ranks of the Iranian clergy in the 16th century Theological University at QOM.
President Obama therefore has support in an influential section of the Iranian establishment. As the dialogue with Iran proceeds, this segment can be moulded into a credible lobby provided, in the process Iranian nationalism is not touched on the raw. Because in that case everyone in Iran will close ranks. Such is the nature of the Iranian people.
Internal to Iran is an important drama proceeding in parallel. For Rafsanjani this could well be a fight to the finish, now that members of his family have been detained on corruption charges. Taking sides in this quarrel will not help. In fact the West may well have to take a call soon on Rafsanjani’s expendability in the interest of a larger purpose, which includes tactful management of the nuclear issue.
# # # # # #
Thursday, October 1, 2009
The K-Word and a House in Disorder
The K-Word and a House in Disorder
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 10.07.2009
With Shopian, Kupwara and Baramula blowing up in our faces in Kashmir, two broad attitudes dictate themselves: (a) this sort of thing keeps happening in Kashmir and (b) we have to start putting our house in order because Kashmir will acquire a profile after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit even though the “K” word will be shrouded in confidentiality.
Let us pick up the narrative from Shopian, a small town with a population of 60,000 in Pulwara District of Southern Kashmir.
It has always been an intellectually alert town. Long years ago a friend of mine Shamim Ahmad Shamin, a proud Shopiani, edited a lively newspaper. Aaina or Mirror.
After the liberal politics of people like Shamim came to an end, the political space has been occupied by leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami like Maulana Mohammad Amin Shopiani and Maulana Ahrar Shopiani.
This is the setting in which the recent drama was played out.
In Kashmir, as elsewhere in India, an unstated caste structure operates. Nilofer, daughter of a high caste Saiyid or a Pir, fell in love with Shakeel Mir, a small businessman, of a lower caste than the Pirs. The Pirs disowned Nilofer.
On May 29, Nilofer and her sister-in-law, Aasiya, went out to tend the family fields adjacent to a river. The route they took was through the civil lines with a regular CRPF camp on one side of the road and a Special Operations Group on the other. The police station is nearby. An unnamed witnessed saw them return not by the regular bridge but trying to balance on temporarily assembled logs, a sort of short cut. At this stage the narrative enters the arena of speculations, allegations, possible political manipulation.
When Nilofer and Aasiya did not return home, Shakeel reported the matter to the police Nilofer’s body was found on a small island created in the river by the water having receded. Her clothes were allegedly torn and there appeared to have been a scuffle. Descriptions of Aasiya’s body – as alleged – were even more gruesome. Her body, found further down the river, was stark naked.
There are allegations aglore, mostly against the police: they sent the bodies immediately to the hospital for post mortem, they did not secure the scene of crime/mishap for on-the-spot inquiries; post mortem was conducted by doctors on temporary duty; Chief Minister Omar Abdullah absolved the police on the basis of this spurious post mortem; The SSP admitted he got involved in the case late because he was busy with his gymnasium exercises!
Later, the Muzaffar Jan Commission established rape and the whole set of police officers were suspended.
In Kupwara a girl of class 12 was raped and killed. In Shirin village near Baramula a similar incident occurred.
Trouble initially seems to begin with the predominantly Kashmir Muslim police. When crowds are not mollified, the CRPF is called out facilitating slogans of Indian “occupation”.
All these eruptions are manifestations of Political and Administrative failure in Kashmir. Suddenly all the promise reposed in Omar Abdullah appears to have dissipated in the space of a month.
Then Kashmiris are very aware of the fact that of the six months as Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah has spent 38 days in New Delhi!
The President of NC, Farooq Abdullah, is in the Union Cabinet, not in Kashmir. Worse, even his supporters are unhappy with his portfolio. Renewable energy is not a term his constituents know about. They call it “Gobar” or “Dung” Ministry.
The other day he was flailing his arms and complaining to his friends. “They think I have been insulted” he lamented. “They call me Minister of Gobar”. “These fools do not know that R.K. Pachauri won the Noble Prize generating power from Cow Dung!”
Even though there is no durable power center in Pakistan with whom a long term theme can be developed, the hot-house atmosphere in which Kashmiris live will be relieved with any resumption of a dialogue.
Alienation from the political class, army, CRPF, Police and the local bureaucracy is complete: a quick, band – aid, solution could well be a military adviser to Omar Abdullah. By all accounts an army officer who won the hearts and minds was the former Corp Commander in Kashmir, Lt. Gen. Patankar, currently with a New Delhi think tank.
# # # # # #
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 10.07.2009
With Shopian, Kupwara and Baramula blowing up in our faces in Kashmir, two broad attitudes dictate themselves: (a) this sort of thing keeps happening in Kashmir and (b) we have to start putting our house in order because Kashmir will acquire a profile after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit even though the “K” word will be shrouded in confidentiality.
Let us pick up the narrative from Shopian, a small town with a population of 60,000 in Pulwara District of Southern Kashmir.
It has always been an intellectually alert town. Long years ago a friend of mine Shamim Ahmad Shamin, a proud Shopiani, edited a lively newspaper. Aaina or Mirror.
After the liberal politics of people like Shamim came to an end, the political space has been occupied by leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami like Maulana Mohammad Amin Shopiani and Maulana Ahrar Shopiani.
This is the setting in which the recent drama was played out.
In Kashmir, as elsewhere in India, an unstated caste structure operates. Nilofer, daughter of a high caste Saiyid or a Pir, fell in love with Shakeel Mir, a small businessman, of a lower caste than the Pirs. The Pirs disowned Nilofer.
On May 29, Nilofer and her sister-in-law, Aasiya, went out to tend the family fields adjacent to a river. The route they took was through the civil lines with a regular CRPF camp on one side of the road and a Special Operations Group on the other. The police station is nearby. An unnamed witnessed saw them return not by the regular bridge but trying to balance on temporarily assembled logs, a sort of short cut. At this stage the narrative enters the arena of speculations, allegations, possible political manipulation.
When Nilofer and Aasiya did not return home, Shakeel reported the matter to the police Nilofer’s body was found on a small island created in the river by the water having receded. Her clothes were allegedly torn and there appeared to have been a scuffle. Descriptions of Aasiya’s body – as alleged – were even more gruesome. Her body, found further down the river, was stark naked.
There are allegations aglore, mostly against the police: they sent the bodies immediately to the hospital for post mortem, they did not secure the scene of crime/mishap for on-the-spot inquiries; post mortem was conducted by doctors on temporary duty; Chief Minister Omar Abdullah absolved the police on the basis of this spurious post mortem; The SSP admitted he got involved in the case late because he was busy with his gymnasium exercises!
Later, the Muzaffar Jan Commission established rape and the whole set of police officers were suspended.
In Kupwara a girl of class 12 was raped and killed. In Shirin village near Baramula a similar incident occurred.
Trouble initially seems to begin with the predominantly Kashmir Muslim police. When crowds are not mollified, the CRPF is called out facilitating slogans of Indian “occupation”.
All these eruptions are manifestations of Political and Administrative failure in Kashmir. Suddenly all the promise reposed in Omar Abdullah appears to have dissipated in the space of a month.
Then Kashmiris are very aware of the fact that of the six months as Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah has spent 38 days in New Delhi!
The President of NC, Farooq Abdullah, is in the Union Cabinet, not in Kashmir. Worse, even his supporters are unhappy with his portfolio. Renewable energy is not a term his constituents know about. They call it “Gobar” or “Dung” Ministry.
The other day he was flailing his arms and complaining to his friends. “They think I have been insulted” he lamented. “They call me Minister of Gobar”. “These fools do not know that R.K. Pachauri won the Noble Prize generating power from Cow Dung!”
Even though there is no durable power center in Pakistan with whom a long term theme can be developed, the hot-house atmosphere in which Kashmiris live will be relieved with any resumption of a dialogue.
Alienation from the political class, army, CRPF, Police and the local bureaucracy is complete: a quick, band – aid, solution could well be a military adviser to Omar Abdullah. By all accounts an army officer who won the hearts and minds was the former Corp Commander in Kashmir, Lt. Gen. Patankar, currently with a New Delhi think tank.
# # # # # #
PM's Gamble at Sharm El Sheikh
PM's Gamble at Sharm El Sheikh
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 21.07.2009
That Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was to be in New Delhi soon upon Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s return from Sharm el Sheikh need not have been the primary reason for the joint Indo-Pak statement issued at the Egyptian resort.
But US officials have, nevertheless, gone out of their way to emphasize that Clinton’s was a bilateral visit, and that any hyphenation with Pakistan should be discounted. In the Washington – New Delhi – Islamabad parlance the term “de hyphenate” has acquired a distinct connotation. It largely means “Kashmir shall not be mentioned”.
Sure, Kashmir was not mentioned at Sharm el Sheikh, but “all outstanding issues” between the two countries were. Obviously, both the delegations are quite clear that the blanket formulation covers Kashmir.
Not just this. Manmohan Singh has gone much further than any Indian leader in the past.
He even allowed “Balochistan and other areas” mentioned in the Statement. Paragraph six says:
“Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas”. The sentence has been inserted to strengthen Gilani’s hand. Pakistan will now be expected to do everything in its power to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice.
Some delivery on this count has already taken place. Pakistan has for the first time ever actually charged some of the culprits. The pace of hearings and eventual conviction has been left vague. In fact Pakistan will find Clinton’s statement in this regard helpful. In an interview with Times Now channel she expressed confidence about Pakistani actions against Mumbai terrorists but she gave Islamabad a bit of a rope by saying that “we know from all over 9/11 experience” that legal processes can take considerable time.
Hawks in New Delhi are already splitting hairs on another formulation. “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed”.
In 2005 Manmohan Singh and Gen. Musharraf had agreed that the bilateral Peace Process was “irreversible”, and that acts of terrorism should not be allowed to derail the process. This was clear recognition of the fact that there were in Pakistan, powerful groups who would wreck any process that leads to an Indo-Pak rapprochement.
Who are these malignant interests? Well, in the short term the Al Qaeda – Taleban would like the Indo-Pak border to hot up so that Pak troops are pulled away from the NWFP and the border with Afghanistan where militants are taking some stick. The long term resistance to normalization with India comes from the all powerful Pak Army which sees in peace a dilution of its raisson d’etre.
Reverting to Sharm el Sheikh, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has taken a gamble, alright, but it is a relatively safe gamble. It is clear as daylight that between nuclear armed neighbours war is no option. Only a dialogue process is. This process has the potential of enlarging that constituency in Pakistan which is opposed to Islamic militancy as well as Army rule.
It must be recognized that the threat to the Dialogue Process is from either of these elements separately or in conjunction.
Remember, (and I have first hand knowledge of this) from the February 2008 Pak elections upto 26/11, Mumbai, there was in Pakistani public discourse no unfriendly mention of India or of Kashmir. So discredited was the Pak Army fighting the then unpopular war in the North – West that officers would not be seen in their uniforms even doing grocery shopping, outside the cantonments.
26/11 changed all that.
Ofcourse we were all angry at the spectacle of iconic buildings in Mumbai ablaze. But it is precisely in these moments of national anger that the media’s role becomes one of great responsibility: angry, without becoming hysterical; critical without losing fidelity to facts; channelizing national anger not aggravating it to feverishness, irresponsibly losing sight of purpose. Instead of targeting the perpetrators of Mumbai, namely the army, ISI and their Jehadi “assets”, the media tarred all of Pakistan with one brush, weakening that huge constituency which had begun to look forward to friendship with India.
In response to India’s media barrage, the Pak media, so far extremely critical of the army, closed ranks in retaliation, causing public opinion, so far focused on Jehadism and the Army, to regard India with rediscovered hostility. The perpetrators of Mumbai had succeeded.
And guess what was the eventual outcome. Pak Army officers could once again do their grocery shopping in full uniform!
# # # # # #
By Saeed Naqvi
Dated: 21.07.2009
That Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was to be in New Delhi soon upon Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s return from Sharm el Sheikh need not have been the primary reason for the joint Indo-Pak statement issued at the Egyptian resort.
But US officials have, nevertheless, gone out of their way to emphasize that Clinton’s was a bilateral visit, and that any hyphenation with Pakistan should be discounted. In the Washington – New Delhi – Islamabad parlance the term “de hyphenate” has acquired a distinct connotation. It largely means “Kashmir shall not be mentioned”.
Sure, Kashmir was not mentioned at Sharm el Sheikh, but “all outstanding issues” between the two countries were. Obviously, both the delegations are quite clear that the blanket formulation covers Kashmir.
Not just this. Manmohan Singh has gone much further than any Indian leader in the past.
He even allowed “Balochistan and other areas” mentioned in the Statement. Paragraph six says:
“Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas”. The sentence has been inserted to strengthen Gilani’s hand. Pakistan will now be expected to do everything in its power to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice.
Some delivery on this count has already taken place. Pakistan has for the first time ever actually charged some of the culprits. The pace of hearings and eventual conviction has been left vague. In fact Pakistan will find Clinton’s statement in this regard helpful. In an interview with Times Now channel she expressed confidence about Pakistani actions against Mumbai terrorists but she gave Islamabad a bit of a rope by saying that “we know from all over 9/11 experience” that legal processes can take considerable time.
Hawks in New Delhi are already splitting hairs on another formulation. “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed”.
In 2005 Manmohan Singh and Gen. Musharraf had agreed that the bilateral Peace Process was “irreversible”, and that acts of terrorism should not be allowed to derail the process. This was clear recognition of the fact that there were in Pakistan, powerful groups who would wreck any process that leads to an Indo-Pak rapprochement.
Who are these malignant interests? Well, in the short term the Al Qaeda – Taleban would like the Indo-Pak border to hot up so that Pak troops are pulled away from the NWFP and the border with Afghanistan where militants are taking some stick. The long term resistance to normalization with India comes from the all powerful Pak Army which sees in peace a dilution of its raisson d’etre.
Reverting to Sharm el Sheikh, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has taken a gamble, alright, but it is a relatively safe gamble. It is clear as daylight that between nuclear armed neighbours war is no option. Only a dialogue process is. This process has the potential of enlarging that constituency in Pakistan which is opposed to Islamic militancy as well as Army rule.
It must be recognized that the threat to the Dialogue Process is from either of these elements separately or in conjunction.
Remember, (and I have first hand knowledge of this) from the February 2008 Pak elections upto 26/11, Mumbai, there was in Pakistani public discourse no unfriendly mention of India or of Kashmir. So discredited was the Pak Army fighting the then unpopular war in the North – West that officers would not be seen in their uniforms even doing grocery shopping, outside the cantonments.
26/11 changed all that.
Ofcourse we were all angry at the spectacle of iconic buildings in Mumbai ablaze. But it is precisely in these moments of national anger that the media’s role becomes one of great responsibility: angry, without becoming hysterical; critical without losing fidelity to facts; channelizing national anger not aggravating it to feverishness, irresponsibly losing sight of purpose. Instead of targeting the perpetrators of Mumbai, namely the army, ISI and their Jehadi “assets”, the media tarred all of Pakistan with one brush, weakening that huge constituency which had begun to look forward to friendship with India.
In response to India’s media barrage, the Pak media, so far extremely critical of the army, closed ranks in retaliation, causing public opinion, so far focused on Jehadism and the Army, to regard India with rediscovered hostility. The perpetrators of Mumbai had succeeded.
And guess what was the eventual outcome. Pak Army officers could once again do their grocery shopping in full uniform!
# # # # # #
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