Rafsanjani to Mollify Saudis On Iran
Nuclear Deal
Saeed Naqvi
After the partial nuclear deal with
Iran in Geneva, the US will divide its attention over two important theatres.
In the Middle East, it will have Russia as its partner and foil. China will be
more hands on in the Pacific where, Pivot to Asia, is the US’s other principal
thrust.
In the Middle Eastern theatre the
Iran deal sets into motion two processes. One is the non-proliferation issue
which P5+2 will juggle with. This is the group where Israeli intelligence will
keep furnishing inputs about Iran’s venality. These stories will start being
leaked, well (with a shrug of the shoulders) next week.
The main dynamic the Iran deal has
set into motion is what I call R5+2. R5 stands for the five regional powers:
Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Turkey and Iran. The plus two are the US and
Russia.
If you have grown accustomed to
seeing Syria as the centre of the regional universe for the past two and a half
years, the Iran deal should place that issue in proper perspective.
Consider the impact of the deal on
the R5, one by one.
Saudi Arabia has in the last few
days seen its hold on the GCC countries loosen. To keep himself and his Kingdom
in play, Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal, addressing the GCC, suggested that
the Kuwait Foreign Minister lead the group to Washington protesting against the
deal. Kuwait refused as did the UAE Foreign Minister who, instead, travelled to
Moscow to sign different another affidavit.
There are two different appraisals
of Saudi vulnerability in the context of the deal. First is the power struggle
behind the curtains, a fierce war of succession. A regime so divided and
debilitated is more likely to acquiesce in the new arrangement of power in the
Mid-East. But the opposite can also happen. A regime weakened internally is
unlikely to be able to resist the ultra conservative clergy.
A more thoughtful approach,
one which the dominant foreign policy elite in Tehran is inclined towards,
considers the present power structure in Riyadh as the one most likely to be
reasonable in the altered regional scenario.
Two terms former President of Iran,
Hashemi Rafsanjani, shares this view. This comes across in an interview he gave
to London’s Financial Times. He obviously maintained his personal relationship
with Riyadh even during the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad period. In fact he was invited
by the Saudi King to perform Haj last month. It was impossible for Rafsanjani
to accept the invitation because American back channels with Iran were at a
sensitive stage.
Rafsanjani will travel to Riyadh but
only after preparations have been made for such a visit. Iran’s top leadership
has to arrive first at a consensus on “de escalation” with Saudi Arabia.
Rafsanjani believes a comprehensive deal with the West is possible in a year,
without much Saudi opposition.
Saudi’s extraordinary clout derives
from their two assets, the holiest Muslim shrines at Mecca and Medina and the
world’s largest reserves of oil in Qatif the eastern provinces, which is also
overwhelmingly Shia. Rapprochement with Teheran, de escalates tensions in Qatif
which, in turn, enables Riyadh to tone down the Sunni-Shia divide it promoted
regionally as part of its anti Iran foreign policy.
The informed view in Teheran is that
the Saudi power structure is a sort of tripod: Wahhabism, Salafism and the
regime in Riyadh which has a sprinkling of closet liberals. That the regime
remains intact is in everybody’s interest. Should it weaken, Wahhabism’s clout
grows, providing succour in the region to groups like the al Qaeda.
For Turkey, the Iran deal provides
an escape from the mess it has unnecessarily landed itself into because it
misread the Arab Spring and the foreign induced Syrian civil war. Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdogan, having increased his party’s vote share in three
successive elections, looked like one of the world’s model statesmen. He
improved the economy, promised peace with all his neighbours.
There was always in him something of
an Islamist. In 1997 he was found violating canons of Kemalist secularism. He
was jailed. His guilt? A poem he recited in public: “the mosques are our
barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our
soldiers.”
To keep buoyant in politics, he went
into “taqayya”, disguising his faith. He was a roaring success as Prime
Minister. But when Muslim Brotherhood started sprouting here and there,
nurtured by the Arab Spring, the West set him up as a model for a changing
Middle-East. He naively bit the bait, egged on by his Sancho Panza, foreign
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. He turned up in Tripoli for thanks giving prayer in
the city square after Muammar Qaddafi’s brutal murder. Apparently Mustafa Kemal
Pasha had taken part in some Libyan battle. Sprouted in Erdogan’s mind a
regional architecture based on nostalgia for Ottoman rule. By now, his Islamism
in full throttle, he became the principal frontline state for sending in men
and material to Syria’s Islamist opposition. Prime Minister of secular Kemalist
state fuelling Islamic fundamentalism next door?
When the writing on the wall became
clear after the Iran deal, Davutoğlu turned up in Teheran, cap in hand.
Erdogan, meanwhile is off to Moscow. Iranian gas is a blandishment. Iran has
also sought names of ten Israeli spies of Iranian origin operating out of
Turkey. Internal dynamics in Turkey suggest President Abdullah Gul is on the
ascendant. Erdogan and Davutoğlu may well be shown the door, if balance is to
be restored in Ankara.
On Egypt, Iran feigns indifference
to what the US wants: a regime which is not overtly hostile to Israel. The real
expectation in Teheran is that the Obama administration will pitch in strongly
for a two state solution, with security guarantees for Israel. This brings
Washington in line what Teheran is most comfortable with: a President Jimmy
Carter like approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Also, former National
Security Council member, Bruce Riedel’s condemnation of double standards on the
nuclear question in the Middle East goes down well with folks in Teheran. This
was Erdogan’s line too until he lost the plot in the Middle East.
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