After
Soleimani: The Cost-Benefit For US, Israel, Saudi And Iran
Saeed Naqvi
When Donald Trump did not take even arch
ally, the UK, into confidence when Iran’s Gen. Qassem Soleimani was murdered, how
prepared the US would have been for an expanded military engagement? The Iranian
missile attacks on a range of US bases are a straightforward retaliation: bases
from where attack on Soleimani was launched have been targeted. The conflict so
far has been contained.
Ofcourse, the US is in readiness. Already,
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is being readied, which will pose a few
questions for New Delhi, exactly of the nature that Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar
faced during Operation Desert Storm. Chandra Shekhar allowed US bombers to
refuel on their way to Iraq.
Even as the post cold war world
transited to the post 9/11 Islamophobia, New Delhi, by choice and circumstance,
held firmly onto American coat tails, even putting up with an insult or two. Pakistan,
and not India, was first incorporated into the global war on terror. US Ambassador
Robert Blackwill was terse: “Your’s is an old regional quarrel with Pakistan;
that country is partnering us in our global war on terror.” Only after December
13, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament, did New Delhi become a bonafide “victim
of terror”. It was a strange triangle: New Delhi and Islamabad were not on
talking terms, but both were yoked in the US led war on terror.
This was the state of play when in April
2003, George W Bush was pushed into occupying Iraq by his neo-con drum beaters
sketching designs of “full spectrum dominance” in the New American century. It was
all very tempting when the Americans invited New Delhi to be their partners in
Iraq which was now “theirs”. A section of South Block was having orgasms at the
prospect. India was being invited to be an occupying power in Iraq’s Kurdish
north. Atal Behari Vajpayee as Prime Minister put his foot down: it was a
foolish idea.
The real author of the Iraq expedition,
Vice President Dick Cheney choreographed his victory speech on April 9, 2003 to
synchronize with the pulling down of Saddam Hussain’s statue at Baghdad’s Palestine
Square. The celebrating Iraqis did not appear.
In desperation, Americans contacted Shia
clerics like Muqtada Sadr. The cleric was an iconic figure in a Shia ghetto
north of Baghdad named Saddam city. Muqtada Sadr it was who mobilized Shia’s to
come out in celebration, beating Saddam’s photographs with chappals even as the
marines pulled down the statue with cranes. In deference to this act, the occupying
power renamed Saddam city as Sadr city.
This is how intimate the US’s relations
have been with the mercurial cleric from the beginning of the occupation. These
relations have fluctuated from mutual dependence to total hostility. A nationalist
to the bones, Sadr would welcome help from someone like Qassem Soleimani but
would be uncomfortable if Soleimani’s Iranian charisma overwhelmed his.
Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi
was someone Defence Secretary Mark Esper consulted half an hour before the
assassination. “I advised him against the decision” Mahdi revealed. But “half
an hour” in the circumstances, was eternity. He could have alerted Soleimani’s
convoy. Why did he not?
In the convoy was also Abu Mahdi
al-Muhandis the Deputy Head of Hashd al Shaabi, or Iraq’s popular mobilization,
which has the sanction of Grand Ayatullah Ali Sistani in Najaf. It reflect on
American caprice that in 2005 Sistani was a figure of adoration in the US
establishment. In March of that year Thomas Friedman of the New York Times had
proposed the Nobel Peace Prize for Sistani in his column titled “A Nobel for
Sistani”.
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was clearly
Soleimani’s eyes and ears in Iraq. But he was only the second in command of the
Hashd. Where was the leader of the Hashd, Falih al Fayyadh? Last month he had
made a surprise visit to Washington to meet Defence Secretary Esper, the very same
person who alerted Prime Minister Mahdi about the action which killed Soleimani,
Muhandis and a host of others.
The information obtained by Esper
directly may have encouraged him to believe that the anti American line up in
Iraq was a divided house. Even Muqtada Sadr’s visit to Riyadh some months ago
would have been taken into this calculus.
The consequence is that the assassination-in-a
hurry has united even disparate forces in Iran, Iraq and the larger West Asia. It
left Europe dazed, Britain embarrassed and the rest of the world wondering as
to what would happens next. The only country to have expressed support for the
action is Israel. And Israel is on notice by the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan
Nasrallah. An attack on Hezbollah from any of the players, in the region or
beyond, would be an invitation to Hezbollah to retaliate “massively” on Israel.
Incidentally, New Delhi has been in interaction
with Falih al Fayyadh. He arranged for the Institute of Defence Studies and
Analysis to be affiliated with al Nahran Centre for Strategic Studies in
Baghdad. Studies by IDSA will surely augment the pool South Block will require
to shape a consistent policy.
Soleimani caused extreme discomfort to
the US, Israel, Saudi combine not because he was plotting military actions. He was
hated because by knitting together powerful proxies on the periphery of Israel
and Saudi Arabia he had defeated the strategic faultline invented by US-Israeli
strategists. Palestinian issue had lost salience gloated the new theorists. Sunni
Shia was the new strategic faultline. With the inauguration of the Kuala Lampur
summit of Islamic countries, and the winning lineup in West Asia, US and its
allies look increasingly cornered and isolated. In this Soleimani had a
decisive role as he did in defeating ISIS much to the chagrin of those who had
begun to see terror groups as an asset to be relocated from one theatre of
conflict to the other.
Once the dust settles, Soleimani in his
death will be seen to have achieved something he strove for: US departure from
Iraq. A US field commander’s letter leaked to Reuters suggests plans for an
exit strategy.
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